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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT MUST ACCEPT THE ALLEGATIONS IN 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AS TRUE. 
Procedurally, this case is simple and straight-forward. 
Ronald M. Boyle, et al., (the "Plaintiffs") filed a Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment (the "Complaint") against National Union Fire 
Insurance Company (the "Defendant"). The Defendant filed a Motion 
to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be 
Granted (the "Motion to Dismiss"). Thereafter, the trial court, 
after oral argument, granted the Motion to Dismiss. The trial 
court filed a Statement of the Court of Grounds for Decision in 
accordance with Rule 52, Ut. R. Civ. P., (the "Rule 52 Statement") 
and entered the Order of Dismissal (the "Order"). Plaintiffs 
appeal from that Order. 
Having successfully persuaded the trial court to dismiss the 
Complaint for failure to state a claim, the Defendant now seeks to 
treat the dismissal as a decision on the merits. In the Appellee 
National Union Fire Insurance Company's Brief (the "Defendant's 
Brief"), the Defendant argues that this Court does not have to 
accept the allegations of the Complaint as true. Defendant argues 
that the Court should instead look to the Rule 52 Statement in 
determining whether the trial court properly dismissed the 
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Complaint1. This argument must fail. The Rule 52 Statement is not 
intended, nor can it be construed, to supersede the Complaint for 
purposes of reviewing the Order dismissing the Complaint. The Rule 
52 Statement contains the trial court's conclusions based upon its 
understanding of the facts alleged in the Complaint and elsewhere. 
However, because the Defendant had filed a motion to dismiss, the 
trial court was required to accept the allegations of the Complaint 
as true. Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Ut. 
1990) . Moreover, because no evidence, in the form of affidavits or 
otherwise, was presented to the trial court, the trial court could 
look only to allegations of the Complaint in making its 
determination. All other information, including the arguments of 
counsel and counsel's recitation of "facts," was irrelevant and 
could not serve as a factual basis for the trial court's decision.2 
The only "facts" that the trial court was entitled to consider, and 
1
 The cases cited by Defendant, Reed v. Anderson, 211 P. 2d 206 
(Utah 1949); Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P.2d 818 (Utah 1951) and Backman 
v. Salt Lake County, 375 P.2d 756 (Utah 1962) do not support the 
argument that this Court should not accept the allegations of 
Plaintiff's Complaint as true. Instead, each of those cases only 
stands for the proposition that, if the complaint fails to allege 
facts which would support a cause of action, then the complaint 
should be dismissed. None of the cases state that the court should 
not be constrained to accept the allegations of the complaint as 
true. 
2
 Defendant also quotes extensively from the transcript of the 
hearing on the Motion to Dismiss in an effort to interject material 
that is entirely irrelevant to this Court's decision. Defendant's 
efforts to introduce this material are nothing more than an attempt 
to cloud the issues before this Court. 
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the only "facts" before this Court, are the allegations of the 
Complaint. 
II. 
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO. 
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the 
Complaint did not state a claim for declaratory relief. The 
"standard of review for the trial court's disposition of legal 
questions, whether from a partial summary judgment or declaratory 
judgment, is a correction of error standard, giving no deference to 
the trial court's ruling." Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 
779 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accordingly, the proper 
standard is de novo review of the trial court's decision. 
Defendant contends that because the trial court is empowered 
with the discretion to refuse to render a declaratory judgment the 
appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion, not de novo 
review. The Defendant's position is incorrect. "Courts have 
discretion to decide whether they will exercise jurisdiction under 
the declaratory judgment act. Although this decision is 
discretionary, our standard of review is more stringent than the 
'abuse of discretion' standard; we may substitute our judgment for 
the lower court's." Century Indemnity Co. v McGillacuty's, Inc., 
820 F.2d 269, 270 (8th Cir. 1987). In the present case, the trial 
court's decision granting the Motion to Dismiss was a legal 
conclusion. This Court should review the matter de novo. 
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III. 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO BRING THIS 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION. 
Defendant argues that a "simple review of Terracor. 
evidences that Plaintiffs have not met the required elements of the 
doctrine of standing. . .." (Defendant's Brief at 45). Defendant 
then cites five "required elements" for standing. The decision in 
Terracor, however, does not establish five required elements for 
standing. Instead, Terracor identifies three alternative grounds, 
only one of which must be satisfied for a party to have standing. 
The grounds are alternative, not conjunctive. Terracor v. Utah Bd. 
of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796,799 (Utah 1986). 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, under the first 
alternative, a plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered 
some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake 
in the outcome of the legal dispute. If a plaintiff does not have 
standing under the first alternative, he will have standing under 
the second alternative if no one else has a greater interest in the 
outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all 
unless that particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issues. 
The third alternative is inapplicable to the facts of this case. 
Plaintiffs have standing under the first two alternatives. 
First, each of the Plaintiffs has suffered a monetary loss. The 
only possible avenue of recovery, by court order, is to the extent 
insurance proceeds cover the claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have 
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suffered an injury that gives them a personal stake in the outcome 
of this action and, as a result, the first alternative basis for 
standing is satisfied. 
There is an even more compelling argument for standing under 
the second alternative. The insureds in the underlying tort action 
have all received discharges in bankruptcy. Under no circumstances 
will the insureds have any liability to the Plaintiffs. The 
insureds have no stake in the outcome of the underlying action and, 
as a result, the insureds could not care less about whether 
insurance coverage exists or does not exist. The issues raised by 
the declaratory judgment action will not be raised at all if 
Plaintiffs are not permitted to proceed with this declaratory 
judgment action. In this case, Plaintiffs are the only persons 
with an interest in resolving the insurance issues raised in the 
Complaint and, as a result, are effectively the only persons with 
standing. 
A. Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-201 (1991) does not Divest 
Plaintiffs of Standing or Limit Plaintiffs' Right to Bring a 
Declaratory Judgment Action Against the Defendant. 
Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-201 (1991) 
implicitly requires that an unsatisfied judgment be presented 
before a party can maintain an action against an insurer. 
Defendant asserts that because Plaintiffs do not have a judgment 
against the insureds, Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a 
declaratory judgment action against Defendant. Defendant's 
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argument is incorrect. Section 31A-22-201, which only governs the 
required contents of an insurance policy, provides that: 
Every liability insurance policy shall provide 
that the bankruptcy or insolvency of the 
insured may not diminish any liability of the 
insured to third parties, and that if 
execution against the insured is returned 
unsatisfied, an action may be maintained 
against the insurer to the extent of the 
liabilities covered by the policy. 
The statute provides that all insurers must include in the 
insurance policies a provision regarding the bankruptcy or 
insolvency of the insured. The section also requires that insurers 
include in their policies a provision that allows injured parties 
to commence a direct action for money damages against the insurer 
after a judgment has been obtained and returned unsatisfied. The 
provision is intended to protect injured parties. The provision 
does not limit or eliminate an injured person's right to seek 
declaratory relief. There is absolutely no case law or legislative 
history indicating that this provision was intended to limit a 
party's ability to bring a declaratory judgment action against an 
insurer. If the Utah Legislature had intended to preclude any 
action against an insurer prior to the entry of a judgment against 
the insureds, the legislature could have enacted such a statute.3 
3
 In fact, some states do have such a statute. Many of the 
cases that Defendant relies on in its efforts to dismiss the 
Complaint come out of the state of Maine. The Maine courts reached 
these decisions because the legislature had enacted 24-A M.R.S.A. 
§2904 which provides that: 
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Even if this Court concludes that §31A-22-201 limits injured 
persons rights to bring actions against an insurer, the limitation 
does not apply to the present case. The statute's reference to an 
"execution against the insured that is returned unsatisfied" is a 
reference to a money judgment. In this case, the Complaint seeks 
only declaratory relief, not monetary relief. Accordingly, this 
statute, even if read as Defendant urges, does not preclude the 
Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action. As a result, the statute 
does not eliminate the Plaintiffs' standing. 
B. Contractual Limitations on the Ability to Bring Suit do 
not Apply to Plaintiffs. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are not parties to the 
insurance policies and that as a result, Plaintiffs have no 
standing to bring this action. Defendant also argues that 
Plaintiffs cannot bring this declaratory judgment action because 
the insurance policies specifically preclude direct actions against 
the Defendant until any claim against the insureds has been reduced 
to a judgment. These two positions are entirely contradictory and 
insupportable. It is disingenuous of the Defendant to contend that 
Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment 
action because they are not parties to the insurance policies, and 
at the same time argue that the terms of the insurance policies 
No civil action shall be brought against an 
insurer to reach and apply such insurance 
money until 2 0 days have elapsed from the time 
of the rendition of the final judgment against 
the judgment debtors. 
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should be binding upon Plaintiffs. Defendant cannot have it both 
ways. If Plaintiffs are not parties to the insurance policies, 
which they are not, then the terms of the insurance policies are 
not binding upon them. 
C. The Plaintiff's Declaratory Judgment Action is Not a 
Prohibited Direct Action. 
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have no standing to 
bring this action because, "it has long been the rule in Utah that 
a third party cannot bring a direct action against an alleged 
tortfeasors insurer. . . . "4 (Defendant's Brief at 21). Defendant, 
however, has failed to provide any statutory or case law supporting 
the argument that a separate declaratory judgment action against an 
insurer is a "direct action." To the contrary, it is well settled 
that a separate declaratory judgment action against an insurer is 
not a prohibited direct action. Reagor v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 450 
N.E.2d 512, 515 (111. App. 1980). Thus, even assuming that Utah 
law does prohibit direct actions against insurers, the declaratory 
judgment is not a prohibited direct action and, therefore, 
Plaintiffs have standing to bring the action. 
4
 A declaratory judgment action against an insurer is allowed 
in Utah because it is not a prohibited direct action. As set forth 
in the Brief of Appellant, in Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 
P. 2d 73 7 (Utah 1982) , the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a third 
party could bring a declaratory judgment action against an insurer 
unless the insurer could show that prejudice would result from the 
declaratory action. 
\jts\boyle\appreply pld 8 
D. None of the Cases Cited by Defendant Preclude the 
Plaintiffs' Declaratory Judgment Action Against Defendant. 
The Defendant argues that the better reasoned view outside 
this jurisdiction holds that Plaintiffs, as strangers to the 
insurance policies, have no standing to bring a declaratory action 
against Defendant. (Defendant's Brief at 30). The cases cited by 
Defendant, however, are all legally and factually distinguishable 
from the case at bar and, therefore, do not compel the conclusion 
asserted by Defendant. See e.g., Cross v. Occidental Fire and 
Casualty Co., 347 F.Supp. 342 (W. D. Okla. 1972) (Suit to compel 
payment, not to determine validity of contract after Defendant 
expressly alleged that the contract was void); American Home 
Assurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 475 F.Supp. 1169 (E.D. 
Pa. 1979) (Court declined to grant declaratory relief because 
action was between two insurers seeking a declaration regarding 
excess insurance while the two insurers did not have adverse legal 
interests) ; St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective 
Co. , 675 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (The Court declined to 
grant declaratory relief because the action was between two 
insurers who did not yet have adverse interests) / Smith v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 483 A.2d 344 (Maine 1984) (Plaintiff, an injured party, 
sought a declaration that the insurer had an obligation to provide 
counsel for the insured and the court concluded that the plaintiff 
had no interest in whether the insurer provided the defense or the 
insured chose independent counsel); Anderson v. St. Paul Fire and 
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Marine Ins. Co. , 414 N.W.2d 575 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (Court 
refused to grant declaratory relief because the plaintiff sought to 
establish the liability of the insurer); Belafonte Reinsurance Co. 
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 590 F.2d 187 (S.D. N.Y. 1984) 
(The court concluded that there was no controversy between two 
insurers seeking a determination regarding excess insurance); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Federated Mutual Implement and Hardware Ins. 
Co., 254 F.Supp. 629 (S.C. 1966) (Court declined to grant 
declaratory relief because it was an action between two insurers 
seeking a determination regarding excess insurance); Allen v. 
Pomroy, 277 A. 2d 727 (Maine 1971) (The court declined to grant 
declaratory relief because (1) the injured party sought to maintain 
a civil action directly against the insurer seeking damages for 
injuries and (2) Maine has a statute expressly prohibiting civil 
actions against an insurer until twenty days after the rendition of 
a final judgment); Associated Hospital Service of Maine v. Maine 
Bonding and Casualty Co., 476 A.2d 189 (Maine 1984) (The court 
concluded that the action, which was not a declaratory judgment 
action, was precluded by Maine's statute requiring waiting twenty 
days after obtaining a judgment to bring an action against an 
insurer); Newton v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 371 S.E.2d 782 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1988) (The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment 
contingent upon future or hypothetical events)/ OK Lumber v. 
Providence Washington Ins., 759 P. 2d 523 (Alaska) (Case did not 
involve a declaratory judgment action but rather the court 
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addressed the question of whether the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing extended to third parties to an insurance contract) ; 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 286 F.2d 
91 (3rd Cir. 1961) (Declaratory judgment action between two 
insurers regarding excess insurance); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. 
Standard Accident Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1964) (Court 
would not permit a declaratory judgment action between two insurers 
because there was no actual controversy -- the court recognized 
that there could be an actual controversy between the insurer and 
an injured party); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Kellas, 173 F.2d 120 (1st 
Cir. 1949) (Court concluded that there was no actual controversy 
because (1) all parties agreed on the proper interpretations of the 
provisions for coverage, (2) it was conceded that, under the 
allegations of the complaint, the liabilities asserted against the 
tortfeasors were the type covered by the insurance policies and (3) 
the insurer recognized its duty to defend the tort action); 
American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania Thresherman and 
Farmers Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1960) 
(Declaratory judgment action between two insurers regarding excess 
insurance); Gray v. New Mexico Military Institute, 249 F.2d 28 
(10th Cir. 1957) (Plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendant 
and its employees were negligent) ; Roberts v. Farmers Ins. Co., 53 3 
P.2d 158 (Nevada 1975) (Court would not allow declaratory judgment 
action against an insurer because the insurer agreed to pay any 
judgment obtained against the insured); White v. Goodville Mutual 
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Casualty Co., 596 P.2d 1229 (Kansas 1979) (Plaintiff filed a direct 
action against the insurer seeking monetary damages because 
plaintiff had been unable to serve a copy of the complaint on the 
insured); Zaborac v. American Casualty Co. of Reading Pennsylvania, 
663 F.Supp. 330 (CD. 111. 1987) (The court denied declaratory 
relief because the case involved an indemnity policy rather than 
liability policy and the court concluded that the insurer had no 
obligation until the end of the underlying tort action); Century 
Indemnity Co. v. McGillacuty/ s, Inc., 820 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(Dispute between two insurers regarding excess insurance). 
None of the above cited cases involve relevant facts similar 
to the case at bar. Thus, contrary to the Defendant's assertion, 
other jurisdictions would not preclude Plaintiff's action against 
the Defendant. Under the standards established by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Terracor, Supra., Plaintiffs have standing to bring this 
declaratory judgment action. 
IV. 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WILL TERMINATE 
UNCERTAINTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE EXISTENCE 
OF COVERAGE AND THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE. 
The trial court dismissed the Complaint on the basis that the 
declaratory judgment action would not answer all of the questions 
raised. In rendering this conclusion, the trial court focused on 
the potential uncertainties in the underlying tort action (the 
"Tort Action"). The uncertainties regarding the Tort Action, 
however, have no bearing on the Complaint. 
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The Plaintiffs are seeking a declaration that (1) the 
Insurance Policies are valid, enforceable contracts and (2) that 
the claims alleged in the Tort Action are insured risks. The trial 
court failed to distinguish between the two declarations. 
Likewise, in the Defendant's Brief, the Defendant fails to 
distinguish between the declarations sought by Plaintiffs. To the 
extent the Defendant recognizes that Plaintiffs are seeking two 
declarations, Defendant argues that, "since Plaintiffs essentially 
argue for the first time on appeal that the trial court failed to 
distinguish between the two declarations sought, this Court should 
refuse to consider such claims raised for the first time now or 
abandoned below without any attempt by Plaintiffs to modify the 
trial court's factual findings in such respect." (Defendant's 
Brief at pg. 47.) This statement is without merit. 
In paragraph 32 of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, "as 
persons interested under the Insurance Policies, Plaintiffs are 
entitled to a determination that the Insurance Policies are valid 
and enforceable contracts, and are further entitled to a 
determination that the claims asserted in the Complaint are insured 
risks under the terms of the Insurance Policies." Furthermore, in 
the Rule 52 Statement, the document upon which Defendant places 
such great emphasis, the Court stated that, "this is a case where 
Plaintiffs have filed a Complaint for declaratory relief requesting 
that the Court determine the scope of coverage under and the 
enforceability of an insurance policy or policies . . .." 
\jts\boyle\appreply pld 1 3 
Accordingly, the different declarations sought were clearly before 
the trial court. Defendant's efforts to blur this distinction must 
not be permitted. 
As set forth above, Plaintiffs seek two declarations in this 
action. Plaintiffs are seeking a declaration that the Insurance 
Policies are valid and enforceable contracts. Assuming the 
Insurance Policies are valid and enforceable, Plaintiffs are then 
seeking a declaration that the claims asserted in the Tort Action 
are insured risks under the terms of the Insurance Policies. 
As to the first issue, Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint that 
Defendant has denied liability on the grounds that (1) the 
Insurance Policies are void or voidable due to misrepresentations 
made by the insureds in the respective applications and (2) that 
two of the Insurance Policies expired prior to the time that claims 
were made against the policy. These two issues are entirely 
independent from the Tort Action. Furthermore, whether the 
Insurance Policies are valid is not contingent on the happening of 
another event. The existence of insurance is a condition precedent 
to any recovery by the Plaintiffs. A determination that the 
Insurance Policies are valid and enforceable contracts will 
terminate uncertainty. If they are valid, the Plaintiffs will 
prosecute the Tort Action. If the Insurance Policies are void, 
then Plaintiffs will not prosecute the Tort Action. 
Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that the claims alleged in 
the Tort Action are insured risks under the Insurance Policies. 
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This requested determination does not require the resolution of a 
hypothetical set of facts. Instead, it simply requests that the 
Court determine whether the facts alleged in the underlying Tort 
Action give rise to coverage under the Insurance Policies. If the 
claims are not the type covered by the Insurance Policies, then the 
Tort Action will not be prosecuted. 
Plaintiffs have filed the declaratory judgment action only 
because Defendant denied liability. Defendant argues that, 
"Plaintiffs are improperly seeking declaratory relief so that they 
can essentially determine if it is worth their trouble to proceed 
against the insureds." (Defendant's Brief at 23) . The Plaintiffs' 
efforts are not improper. The existence of insurance is a 
condition precedent to any recovery. Defendant has denied 
liability under the Insurance Policies, alleging that the same are 
void or voidable. The Defendant, by its own action, has given rise 
to the present controversy. It is disingenuous for Defendant to 
now say that Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief to 
resolve the issues raised by the Defendant. The controversy 
created by the Defendant should be resolved by declaratory 
judgment. 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiffs respectfully request 
that this Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of the 
Complaint.5 
Respectfully submitted this /j£ day of November, 1992. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
By Gary N^^-AQderson, Esq. 
and 
SNELL 
an, Esq. 
ivertsen, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
5
 Footnote 4 of the Brief of Appellants states that, " [a] true 
and correct copy of the Fourth Amended Complaint is attached hereto 
as Addendum 4." The Plaintiffs, however, decided not to attach a 
copy of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs inadvertently 
failed to delete footnote 4. 
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